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WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION
By Philip B. Kurland*
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978. Pp. x, 261. $12.50.
Professor Kurland's first sentence asserts that Watergate and the
ConstitutionI is "neither a text nor a treatise on either Watergate or the
Constitution. It is rather a series of essays meant for nonlawyers on the
theme perhaps best described as the constitution and reconstitution of
the Constitution."' 2 This disclaimer highlights both the strength and
the weakness of this series of ten essays on why the office of the Presi-
dency developed imperial trappings, how it grew corrupt under the
reign of Richard Nixon, and what may be done to control it. When
Kurland sticks to his premise--describing the process of growth and
reformation of the Constitution-his book is thought provoking. When
he strays into the cesspools that surround the Watergate affair, he is
much less successful.
Unfortunately, Kurland's promise often exceeds the delivery. There
are some introductory thoughts on extremely fascinating and im-
mensely important issues-for example, the process of judicial amend-
ment of the Constitution? But he barely outlines the scope of these
problems before moving on to other topics. Many of these other topics,
however, are essentially dead issues legally, issues that have been re-
solved for decades for the best of reasons-that historical, political, and
legal arguments in favor of their resolution are unchallenged. For this
reviewer at least, the end result is a sense more of what might have
been and some sorrow that Professor Kurland has not chosen to devote
his talents to a thorough discussion of the serious problems with which
he deals.
Kurland's introductory chapter4 outlines the central evil exposed by
Watergate-the accumulation of power within the Presidency:
* William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago. A.B.,
1942,,University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944, Harvard Law School.
1. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978).
2. Id at ix.
3. Id at 10-16.
4. Id at 1-16. Chapter eight, entitled "Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances,"
discusses essentially the same issues in greater detail. Id at 153-79.
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The constitutional crisis of Watergate was the result of a long buildup
of concentrated governmental power. It was the result of the failure to
adhere to the limitations on authority that are explicit and implicit in the
Constitution. It was the result of long denial of institutional values in
favor of temporary political expediency. The tragedy of Watergate lies
not in the pitiful character of the man exiled from the White House; it lies
rather in the continued failure of the nation to take steps first to cabin and
then to dissipate that accumulated power, the failure to revive our consti-
tutional notions of limitations on authority.5
The author is quite properly concerned with the accumulation of
presidential power. The basis of this concern is not merely the old
cliche about the corrupting effects of power. It is the more subtle but
more accurate observation that we have no guarantee of wise and hon-
est public servants always capable of handling power.6 The power
safely entrusted to a Jefferson or a Lincoln is sadly abused when, all too
often, the public chooses a Harding or a Nixon. Moreover, even the
wisest and the most capable leaders may not always perceive the ad-
verse consequences of their use of power; they seek to gain ends re-
garded as essential and are blind to the costs of their choice of means.
Roosevelt's court-packing plan is an excellent illustration.
As Kurland notes, the founding fathers originally attempted to avoid
accumulation of excess power by drafting a written constitution that
would define forever what each branch of the federal government, and
the government itself, might do. Power was divided among three
branches in the belief that the natural jealousy of each branch of its
own powers would prevent accumulation of excess power in the other
two branches. Power was further subdivided between the federal gov-
ernment and the states and still further subdivided among the various
states, each sovereign in its own realm.7
In the twentieth century this grand constitutional design has become
a myth. Kurland accurately identifies the critical factors in this
5. Id at 5.
6. The contrast in political rhetoric between 1960 and 1976, an extremely short period in the
hfe of the Nation, is illuminating. In 1960 President Eisenhower was said to have failed to exer-
cise leadership in the White House as the country stagnated under the leadership of a resurgent
Congress. By contrast, President Kennedy was the man to get the country moving again, the man
who would pay any price and bear any burden in pursuit of worldwide freedom. The recipe was
greatly increased presidential power. Yet by 1973, a chief White House assistant to President
Kennedy and a distinguished historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., would write in doleful tones of
the imperial Presidency and its attendant opportunities for abuse. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
7. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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change-the economic crisis of the 1930's, which led to a massive shift
of economic and social power from the states to the federal govern-
ment; the emergence of the United States as a world power, which
vastly increased presidential power at the expense of Congress; the geo-
metric growth of the bureaucracy, resistant to all forms of political con-
trol; the growing importance of the judiciary.' To accommodate these
upheavals, the Supreme Court developed a practice of informal
amendment of the Constitution by reinterpreting old language and dis-
carding ancient traditions. Kurland saves his severest remarks for this
process of judicial review that creates informal amendment. He be-
lieves that, more often than not, the Constitution means little more
than what a majority of the Supreme Court says is correct at any one
time. It is equally clear that Kurland mistrusts the legislative and poli-
cymaking abilities of these nine men.9
If Kurland accurately diagnoses the source of uncontrolled presiden-
tial power, he is less than specific in prescribing a cure. Presidential
power is a fact of life in twentieth century America. Congress is institu-
tionally incapable of providing effective leadership. In part this is due
to the nature of the federalist system. Congressmen and senators
elected from individual states and districts owe their first loyalty to the
people who elected them. On most public policy issues, and certainly
those affecting the pocketbook, it is unrealistic to expect these leaders to
consider the national interest ahead of their purely regional or sectional
interest. A senator or congressman whose district is heavily dependent
upon federal military procurement will not take a long-range, national
view of the merits of, for instance, the B- 1 bomber. The national inter-
est might require an affirmative vote on the Panama Canal treaty. But
a senator from Texas, who fears a loss of twenty-five percent of his
constituents if he supports the treaty, will not run the risk. The decline
of the political parties and the rise of single-issue voters and special
interest groups exacerbates the problem. The institutional deficiencies
demand a single national leader, inevitably the President.
The nation's role in world affairs also requires that the President ex-
ercise far greater power than the framers of the Constitution foresaw.
An appropriate response in foreign policy requires an immediate, uni-
fied response, again an executive branch specialty.
Finally, and perhaps most subtly, the public has come to regard the
8. Id at 172-77.
9. Id at 15-16.
[Vol. 1978:840
Washington University Open Scholarship
BOOK REVIEWS
President as the public official most immediately responsible for their
economic and social welfare. If the President bears the responsibility,
he will inevitably seek the power to fulfill it; and the theory that the
power must lie where the responsibility lies will make his search
easier.1°
I think Professor Kurland would agree with my point that presiden-
tial power is historically and politically inevitable. The challenge is not
to reduce it, but to devise means to make it accountable; to ensure that
the President acts only with a full awareness of the consequences of his
actions; to expose the lesser lights who inhabit the White House for
what they are.
The second chapter focuses on one way of making presidential
power accountable-the congressional power of inquiry. Kurland ob-
serves that the constitutional basis for congressional inquiries, whether
explicit or implicit, is extremely weak.ll The founding fathers granted
to Congress certain powers of investigation, but limited them primarily
to the impeachment function. There was, perhaps, some interest in in-
vestigation to obtain factual material upon which to legislate. From a
separation of powers perspective, the primary value of congressional
investigation is its oversight of the executive branch-investigations to
determine how well the executive implements congressional wishes,
when the executive is corrupt, or when it is merely weak or lazy.
The author correctly notes that these latter functions developed more
through custom and long-range usage than through any kind of consti-
tutional sanction. "As with much of our constitutional history, Con-
gress performed its duties as it conceived them to be until the courts
were brought in to tell it what it could do and could not do."' 2 Despite
some early limitations, the Supreme Court has essentially given Con-
gress a free rein in congressional investigation. The Court has, to be
sure, imposed strict due process limitations upon the kinds of questions
a witness must answer and the precision with which Congress must de-
fine and authorize the goals of the investigating committee. But these
rules restrict primarily the means by which Congress conducts its inves-
tigations, rather than the power of investigation. Moreover, these limits
primarily protect the constitutional rights of individual witnesses and
10. Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (responsibility for classifying secret documents must lie with the executive, given his large
degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs).
11. P. KtJRLAND, supra note 1, at 18-21.
12. Id at 23.
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ensure that the committee remains accountable to the whole Congress.
They do not affect the concept of congressional oversight of the execu-
tive branch.
As Kurland properly notes, legislative oversight of the executive is
an integral way to assure that presidential power is accountable.' 3 And
this process, while perhaps not specifically contemplated by the found-
ing fathers, is entirely consistent with their overall views of the relation-
ships among the branches. The natural tendency of each branch to
seek to aggrandize its own power by examining and exposing executive
mistakes, even for base political motives, serves as a powerful check on
the Presidency itself. Despite the Constitution's silence on congres-
sional inquiry, the founding fathers surely would not object to a device
consistent with their overall views of separation of powers. Congres-
sional oversight of the President is an entirely legitimate use of congres-
sional power.
The problem, as the author reminds us, is that the method to legiti-
mize an obviously proper tool such as congressional investigation is
badly wanting. 4 The Supreme Court relied on two devices of doubtful
legitimacy in approving congressional investigations. The first was
legal fiction: a device "by which the Court indulges a presumption that
something is true that it knows is not necessarily true.' 5 The legal
fiction attributed to congressional investigation was the Court's sopho-
moric assumption that all such investigations are aimed at acquiring
information on which to base legislation. Hence, any investigation that
might conceivably have been motivated by the prospect of additional
legislation is justifiable. Safe within the cocoon of its legal fiction, the
Court can conveniently ignore the rational man's disbelief that Con-
gress was in fact motivated by a special legislative goal. The second
device is "law office history."' 6 This entails a selective interpretation of
events and prior statements-often out of context-to justify whatever
result the Court wishes. The sophomoric quality of this historical
scholarship can be conveniently ignored.
Professor Kurland is surely right to chastize the Court for resorting
to these devices for legitimizing custom. Yet, there must be some de-
vice by which the Court can properly recognize a necessary custom that
fills a gap in the explicit language of the Constitution. Unfortunately,
13. Id at 28.
14. Id at 17.
15. Id at 26.
16. Id
[Vol. 1978:840
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Kurland offers no defensible alternative. I would submit that the
proper device is a functional analysis of the constitutional structure and
the place of the custom within that structure. If, like the congressional
power of inquiry, the custom is consistent with the purposes and expec-
tations of the founding fathers, that in itself should establish the consti-
tutional validity of a longstanding custom.
If the power of legislative inquiry is Congress' chief sword in its bat-
tle for political power with the executive, the executive's primary shield
is the ill-defined notion of executive privilege. Chapter three begins
with variations on a theme by Raoul Berger 7 dealing with the "myth"
of executive privilege. Kurland accurately observes that, Professor Ber-
ger's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
has indeed sustained the principle of a constitutional executive privi-
lege for internal discussions between a President and his advisors. 8
But the decision in United States v. Nixon 19 did not resolve many of the
critical questions about the ongoing relationship between the President
and Congress. As Kurland notes, United States v. Nixon dealt with the
relationships between the President and the judiciary in the context of a
criminal prosecution.2" Despite substantial overbreadth in the Court's
opinion, the rule emerging from United States v. Nixon is almost surely
that the President alone may determine when the executive privilege
for internal discussions applies, except in cases where the President
himself is a target of the criminal proceeding.2' Again, despite some
overreaching dicta, the Court did not discuss the relationships between
the President and Congress or between the executive branch and
Congress.
Here, the author once again fails to follow up on a thesis that offers
fascinating possibilities. Quite correctly, he notes the myth that the
President controls the relationships between the executive branch and
Congress. In fact, much of the executive bureaucracy is beyond the
control of even the most skilled White House administrator. It seems
clear that a constitutionally-based executive privilege for internal dis-
cussions is appropriately claimed only by the President, a reform the
Nixon administration first implemented. Without presidential sanc-
17. Id at 34 (citing R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974)).
18. Id
19. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
20. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 34-35.
21. See Note, Executive Privilege and the Freedom of Information Act: The Constitutional
Foundation of the Amended National Security Exemption, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 609, 634.
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tion, the executive bureaucracy could not assert the privilege. The sub-
ject of control of the bureaucracy, however, is only marginally related
to the concept of executive privilege; in general, Congress should be
entitled to such executive information as it wishes as part of its over-
sight duties.
The bulk of the chapter discusses the various reasons for a constitu-
tionally-based internal discussions privilege from congressional inquiry
and gives a blow-by-blow account of some of the tussles between
Nixon administration stalwarts and Congress during the Watergate cri-
sis. In so doing, Kurland fails to distinguish between the internal dis-
cussions privilege and a privilege for state secrets; nor does he
distinguish between the usual claim to executive privilege and a claim
when the President is subject to impeachment. Both omissions are un-
fortunate. As I have argued elsewhere,zz a constitutionally-based exec-
utive privilege for state secrets is indeed a myth because Congress
shares the responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. 23 The privi-
lege is a state privilege and not the exclusive property of the executive
branch. As between the President and Congress, I think it clear that
there is no constitutionally valid executive privilege based exclusively
on state secrets.
The internal discussions privilege presents more complicated issues,
because that privilege, unlike state secrets, is the personal prerogative
of the Executive. It exists solely to protect executive decisionmaking
and consequently is inherently executive in a way that state secrets are
not. My own view is that there should be a constitutionally-based exec-
utive privilege for withholding information from Congress when the
subject of investigation is other than the election, impeachment, or mis-
conduct of the President.
If the privilege for internal discussions is necessarily executive, only
the President can properly determine what dangers attend disclosure to
Congress or the public. Concededly, there will be occasions when the
President makes use of the privilege for base motives, such as personal
political gain. There is obviously a potential conflict of interest when
the President is both the arbiter of the privilege and its ultimate benefi-
ciary. But two additional factors reduce the danger. First, as Kurland
notes, quite often the real combatants are not the President and Con-
gress but the executive bureaucracy and one or another of its supposed
22. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
23. See Note, supra note 21, at 657.
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masters.24 Second, Congress retains informal political power to extract
information essential to congressional duties. Although courts have
been less than enthusiastic in enforcing congressional subpoenas to-the
executive branch,25 Congress has other tools. It can withhold funds,
delay confirmation of nominations, or bottle up in committee bills that
the administration strongly supports. All of these standard political
methods for pressuring the President reduce substantially the possibili-
ties for abuse of executive privilege, for the President must always be
cognizant of the political costs of using it.
The situation is different with respect to presidential impeachment or
other investigations of misconduct. Here, the conflict of interest inher-
ent in the President as both arbiter and beneficiary of the privilege
reaches its maximum. A President in serious danger of impeachment
will obviously have as his paramount goal retention of his office and
will be more insulated from the normal political controls of the legisla-
ture. Simultaneously, his credibility as impartial judge of the propriety
of the privilege will be seriously undermined. When presidential im-
peachment is at issue, therefore, Congress deserves to have its subpoe-
nas for confidential presidential communications fully honored by the
courts, and the District of Columbia Circuit was plainly wrong in hold-
ing to the contrary.26
Chapter five deals with the role of the courts in the Watergate affair.
Kurland properly reserves some of his strongest denunciations of the
judiciary for this chapter. A favorite phrase of the blackjack tables,
"the bank wins, and the players lose," accurately describes the results
of power clashes between the executive, the judiciary, and Congress.
The courts won, and the Congress lost.27 Considering that the courts
were the ultimate arbiters of their own powers, this result is perhaps not
unduly surprising.
The author first discusses the unavailing efforts of the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities to secure judicial en-
forcement of its subpoenas to the President. In Senate Select Committee
24. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 35.
25. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521
(DD.C.), all'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
26. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir.), aft'g 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1974).
27. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 53.
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on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,28 Judge Sirica held that
the court lacked jurisdiction because the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
had not been satisfied. This is perhaps an understandable exercise of
judicial self-restraint by a court seeking to avoid involvement in consti-
tutional crises.
The courts were unable to dodge the issue when the committee acted
pursuant to an explicit statutory authorization of federal jurisdiction.
The district court refused to enforce a subpoena2 9 on the ground that
the committee had not demonstrated the "pressing need" required by
Nixon v. Sirica.30 For perhaps the first time since the 1930's, a federal
court adopted a restrictive view of Congress' needs in acquiring infor-
mation for legislation. But Judge Sirica also noted the complete ab-
sence of presidential interest in secrecy and ultimately resolved the
issue against the committee because of adverse pretrial publicity for the
other Watergate defendants.3 '
The D.C. Circuit affirmed32 the decision, but was sharply critical of
Judge Sirica's approach. The court apparently held that the judiciary
acquires the power to invade an explicit claim of presidential privilege
only when the body seeking the evidence demonstrates a compelling
need. Given the claim of executive privilege, the information sought
was not sufficiently critical to the legislative function to permit the
court to override it. Moreover, any concern about impeachment, the
court said, was satisfactorily resolved by delivery of the requested ma-
terial to the House Judiciary Committee, which was then considering
impeachment.33
Kurland is properly sarcastic about these results:
It will readily be seen that the court here was relying on the existence of
executive privilege as the barrier to access by the Select Committee. It
was a balancing of the privilege against the need of the Select Committee
that was indulged by the court. . . . The executive and the legislative
branches were to be confined in their operations to the degree that the
judicial branch determined, not what was constitutionally prescribed, but
what was the better public policy. Who better equipped with the bases for
judgment as to public policy than the federal judiciary, whose black
robes, like those of Merlin, confer access to wisdom, truth, and justice
28. 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
29. Id at 57.
30. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31. 370 F. Supp. 521, 522-23 (D.D.C. 1974).
32. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
33. Id at 732.
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unavailable to ordinary mortals. 34
Concededly, both district and circuit court wrote opinions open to criti-
cism. But Professor Kurland does not take the extra step to explain
how the judiciary might better have arrived at a principled, constitu-
tional resolution of the issue. Again, I would suggest that a functional
approach is appropriate and that the court should have looked more
closely at the congressional interest in acquiring the information and
the President's interest in keeping it secret. Despite the rule that im-
peachments must originate in the House, it is evident that the Senate
Committee's needs were closely related both to the impeachment proc-
ess and, as its title suggests, the process by which the President is
elected. Both of these interests go directly to the heart of presidential
power. It follows that the President's interest in retaining his secrets in
these areas was fraught with a conflict of interest. Normal restraints
upon presidential defiance of Congress were conspicuously absent. In
these circumstances, a functional analysis of the interactions of the
three branches strongly suggests that the judiciary is better suited to
determine the propriety of the exercise of privilege than is the Presi-
dent. Moreover, the presidential conflict of interest coupled with the
congressional need for information on which to base both impeach-
ment and future legislation to curb executive misrule suggest that the
court should have enforced the congressional subpoena. I suspect that
Professor Kurland agrees with this analysis and only wish that he had
made it more specific.
As the author notes, the courts were substantially more inclined to
override executive privilege when it threatened their own bastions of
power. The first subpoenas issued by the federal grand jury investigat-
ing the Watergate affair went to the courts under the caption of United
States v. Nixon." Judge Sirica held that the privilege would be over-
ridden to the extent of requiring the President to submit the subpoe-
naed information to the court for in-camera review. Material unrelated
to the grand jury's investigation would be excised, but the grand jury
would receive nonprivileged information. 6
On a writ of mandamus, the D.C. Circuit affirmed,37 holding that
there was a longstanding judicial executive privilege and an equally
34. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 57.
35. 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
36. Id at 14.
37. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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longstanding judicial power to override it. Kurland is properly critical
both of the case authority on which the court relied and of the failure to
apply the same reasoning to the congressional subpoenas.3" Examined
from a functional perspective, however, the decision is entirely under-
standable. Especially in light of later events, one can readily appreciate
that the President suffered an inherent and immense conflict of interest
in determining whether national security or internal communications
justified the exercise of the privilege. And if the situation had no prece-
dent, it is perhaps because we have been fortunate to have generally
honest men serving as President.39
Kurland is on much firmer ground in his criticism of the failure of
the court to apply its analysis to the congressional subpoenas, which it
refused to enforce. The conflict of interest was as great with respect to
the Senate Committee, and the elected representatives of the people
had at least as much interest in the information as did a grand jury
under the thumb of the prosecutor. Again, I would submit that a func-
tional analysis provides a principled, consistent basis for judicial reso-
lution of both situations. When a President whose survival in office is
at stake seeks to use executive privilege as a shield-as did President
Nixon during the Watergate affair-he should be disabled from exer-
cising that power. It is entirely appropriate that the judiciary serve as
neutral arbiter in this situation. This analysis produces a consistent re-
sult for both congressional and judicial subpoenas-one in which the
subpoenas would have been enforced.
Chapter five deals with the President's power of appointment and
removal, which was critical to the Watergate affair because of the status
of the special prosecutor.40 The legislation establishing Archibald Cox
as special prosecutor asserted that he was removable only for extraordi-
nary improprieties and thus purported to limit the President's power to
discharge him. Nixon's attempt to do so, of course, precipitated what
later became known as the "firestorm" and played a principal role in the
decline of public confidence that ultimately drove him from office.
I find this essentially uninteresting, in part because it is unlikely to be
38. P. KURLAND, supra note I, at 61.
39. It is significant that the cases most nearly analogous to the Watergate tape cases, United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14694), and United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30
(C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14692), concerned the prosecution of the former Vice President, a bitter
political enemy of President Jefferson. The possibility of a presidential conflict of interest was
obvious.
40. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 75-103.
[Vol. 1978:840
Washington University Open Scholarship
BOOK REVIEWS
of practical importance in an impeachment or investigatory situation,
and in part because the issues have been trampled beneath the weight
of conflicting judicial opinions. As the "firestorm" demonstrated, when
a President has reached the point where a special prosecutor is neces-
sary to investigate charges against him, it is very unlikely that as a mat-
ter of political reality-as opposed to constitutional mandate-he can
safely remove a special prosecutor. Moreover, the history of judicial
expression on the appointment and removal power is hardly an inspir-
ing one.
In part, as Kurland notes, this is because the constitutional history of
the removal power is very unclear.4' There is reasonable evidence in
The Federalist No. 77 that indicates the Senate, as a participant in the
appointment through the advise and consent power, can also exercise
veto power over presidential removal of officers.42 But the issue has
become sufficiently blurred by some other writings,43 especially in the
early days of the Republic, that it is by no means clear.
Professor Kurland notes that three major themes have run through
the courts' attempts to deal with presidential removal powers.44 The
first is unavowedly congressional, at least insofar as officers whose ap-
pointment requires the advice and consent of the Senate. Removal
power follows from the appointive power. The second thesis argues
that removal is inherently an executive power and thus limitable only
by constitutional provision. The third theme focuses on the specific
legislation creating the office. If Congress is permitted to create the
office, it also has the power to specify the terms and conditions on
which its occupant can be removed.
The courts have done very little to clarify which of these themes is to
apply under which circumstances. In the first significant removal case,
Myers v. United States,45 the Court held that removal was exclusively a
presidential option. Chief Justice Taft relied upon the notion of inher-
41. Id at 78-79.
42. Id (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Wright ed. 1961)): "It has been mentioned as one
of the advantages to be expected from the cooperation of the Senate, in the business of appoint-
ments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body
would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint."
43. 1d at 80. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 516'(J. Gales ed. 1789).
44. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 85.
45. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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ent presidential power to appoint, which consequently gave him the
exclusive power to remove an officer. Holmes46 and Brandeis 47 dis-
sented, essentially on the ground that Congress had created the office in
question-a small town postmaster-and therefore could state the con-
ditions for removal.
The President's inherent power to remove, however, went the way of
the buffalo in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,4 in which, as Kur-
land puts it, "Myers was distinguished to death."' 49 The key question in
Humphrey's Executor was whether Humphrey had occupied a "purely
executive" office. As to such offices, the President has complete discre-
tion to terminate appointments. With respect to other offices, however,
the presumption is otherwise: Unless the legislature specifically grants
exclusive power to the President, he lacks the authority to terminate an
officer.
The functional analysis employed in Humphrey's Executor is a much
better way to resolve the issue than the sledgehammer presidential
powers approach of Myers. At least for offices created and funded by
Congress, it seems only reasonable that Congress can specify terms,
duties, and other obligations of the office in the enacting legislation,
except when the Constitution specifically directs otherwise. The courts
have lived with such a limitation since 1787: Since Congress has the
power to create lower federal courts, it also has the power to limit their
jurisdiction.5 0 I would reverse the presumption only with respect to
offices that are essential to the conduct of the Presidency per se-that is,
the counsel to the President, other members of the White House staff,
and others in similar privity with the President
The most enjoyable part of this chapter is Kurland's trenchant criti-
cism of the reasoning process in Myers and, indeed, in many of the
Supreme Court's constitutional opinions:
What the Myers' opinions-majority and dissenting-reveal is that politi-
cal questions will be decided in the courts by political judgments. I do not
mean party allegiance when I speak of political judgments. Rather, the
questions were answered the way writers of constitutions would answer
them. Is it better to afford this power to the executive than to preserve it
for congressional control? The issue was not how the Founders answered
46. Id at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
47. Id at 240 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48. 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
49. P. KuRLAND, supra note 1, at 95.
50. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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or would have answered the question; the issue was which alternative the
judicial body would say is the better policy. Moreover, it is not what
would have been better policy at the time of the founding of the nation,
but what was better policy for the issues and conditions at the time of
decision.51
My only criticism of this remark is that it understates a principal
thesis of the founding fathers. Obviously, if the constitutional language
or history offers a reasonable, clear answer, it should be dispositive.
When the constitutional language or history is silent or ambiguous, as
in the removal power, a functional analysis best captures the founding
fathers' approach. They were essentially pragmatists, concerned with
how the government should work. To preserve the spirit of the Consti-
tution in the twentieth century, the adjudication of constitutional ques-
tions should inquire hdw the branches will function together, given
men of average intelligence, integrity, and good will, and which of the
various possible resolutions of the issue will best preserve the constitu-
tional separation of powers. Given the pragmatism of the founding
fathers, I strongly suspect that this kind of functional analysis will ac-
cord with the available constitutional history.
Chapter six addresses the nature of impeachment, the standard re-
quired for a legal impeachment, and the issue of its judicial review-
ability. I find these subjects uninteresting primarily because they are
dead issues. Concededly, a President who is about to be removed from
office will have supporters who contend, as Nixon's did, that "high
crimes and misdemeanors" 52 means indictable crimes. But the evi-
dence Kurland adduces, and for that matter the nature of the impeach-
ment tool itself, has settled the question.53 Impeachment is a means
for removing officers who abuse their trust. As a tool for removing
those who abuse their power, it is clear that there is no purpose
whatever in requiring an indictable crime.
I am equally in accord with Professor Kurland that judicial review of
impeachment proceedings was neither contemplated by the founding
fathers nor at all desirable.54 For removal is essentially a political tool
to rid the Nation of one who has served it poorly; it is a political ques-
tion in every sense of that oft-abused term. Even in the reapportion-
ment cases, the Court recognized the political question doctrine as one
51. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 94.
52. Id at 506 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4).
53. Id at 106-16.
54. Id at 130.
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of separation of powers, one that disables the judiciary from acting.
Despite Kurland's fears,55 I find it inconceivable that the Supreme
Court could fail to recognize that removal of a President from office for
abuse of power is a question far better left to the ballot box than to
resolution on legal principles. It is not, in the end, a legal question but
a political one: Has the President abused his trust? Not only is that
function expressly assigned elsewhere in the Constitution, but it is a
question that hardly lends itself to the application of definable judicial
standards.
Kurland next discusses presidential prosecutions and presidential
pardons. He is squarely opposed to the indictment of a sitting Presi-
dent.5 6 First, there is a complete lack of evidence that the founding
fathers ever contemplated such a prospect. More importantly, it runs
counter to their pragmatic natures to assume that the Constitution
could submit the head of the Government to the indignity of a criminal
trial. As Kurland notes:
The President is, by reason of the fact that the executive power of the
United States is vested in him, a unique official. He is the only officer of
the United States whose duties under the Constitution are entirely his
responsibility and his responsibility alone. He is the sole indispensable
man in government, and his duties are of such a nature that he should not
be called from them at the instance of any other government or branch of
government.57
This conclusion is reinforced by the availability of an impeachment
procedure for removal from office, after which indictment and trial is
plainly available. While the Supreme Court has never resolved the is-
sue, even an activist Court would have great difficulty in overcoming
these considerations with the doubtful advantage of advancing by a few
months the indictment of a criminal President.
The nature of presidential pardons arose in the Watergate context
because of the Nixon pardon before indictment or trial. Professor Kur-
land's primary challenge to the legality of the pardon was that it oc-
curred before arraignment, indictment, or conviction. He makes a
reasonable case that the pardon might have been illegal.58
Pardons are like the quality of mercy, falling on the just and unjust
alike. For pardons of ex-Presidents for crimes committed in office, it is
55. Id at 133-35.
56. Id at 135.
57. Id
58. rd at 143-44.
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absolutely essential that his successor have the power immediately to
pardon even a Nixon. Impeachment of a sitting President at any time
is a cataclysmic event. The greatest need after such a storm is to restore
the ship of state to calm waters. I cannot conceive that indictment and
trial of an elected but deposed President, who, however great his mis-
deeds, will continue to have millions of devoted supporters, could at all
advance that goal. Quite the contrary, criminal trial following im-
peachment trial serves no purpose other than revenge upon a fallen
leader. If the prospect of losing the Presidency does not deter future
Presidents from offense, I think it highly unlikely that a jail term will.
Nor is the deposed President likely to be in much danger of reassuming
his office; impeachment tends to have a rather destructive effect on po-
litical careers. Accordingly, I am highly suspicious of any arguments
that a premature blanket pardon of a deposed President for crimes
committed in office could be anything but constitutional.
The last two chapters will be treated in reverse order. Chapter ten
discusses the theory of the plebiscitary Presidency espoused and
brought to its ultimate form by Richard Nixon. The theory of a plebis-
citary Presidency is essentially that, once safely ensconced in office with
a large majority, the President may dispense with separation of powers
and all forms of presidential accountability.
These constitutional devices are viewed as inefficient and as tending
to block or at least greatly hinder the will of-the majority, which has
selected the President. Further, the mandate of the people grants to the
President the leadership of the Nation, a leadership entrusted to him by
the magic of the ballot box against which none can stand.59
The corollary to this concept of complete absence of accountability is
that "when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal."6 In
short, once in office, "l'etat c'est moi," at least until the President's term
expires. It need hardly be added that such a concept of the Presidency
is wholly at odds with the Constitution, a point the author makes via
the steel seizure case 6' and at greater length than necessary.62
But Kurland also warns that, though Nixon was the foremost practi-
tioner of the theory of the plebiscitary Presidency, he was not the inno-
vator of its technique. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the consistent
refusal of Presidents to release information to Congress, the impound-
59. Id at 152.
60. Id at 222.
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
62. P. KURLAND, supra note 1, at 205-10.
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ment of funds, and above all the concentration of power within the
White House and its executive staff were all devices employed long
before the Nixon administration to expand the power of the Presidency
in particular battles.63
The difference, of course, is that Nixon's contribution, if one wants to
call it that, was to combine and coordinate these past efforts and to use
them persistently until they came to replace the democratic institutions
that other Presidents accepted. Kurland correctly identifies the central
factor in this process as the growth of the White House staff and the
development of the White House Office.' 4
Chapter nine examines some of the Watergate-inspired reforms that
purport to limit presidential power. The only substantial reform en-
acted into law was the limitation on presidential campaign spending,
which Kurland regards as a weak palliative for the real evils that affect
the Presidency.65 Kurland is far more concerned with the development
of the concept of a "political police," which Nixon came close to ac-
quiring with his abuse of the Internal Revenue Service, his develop-
ment of the White House "plumbers," and perhaps his use of the
Central Intelligence Agency. He fears that the intelligence establish-
ment may become the twentieth century version of the "standing army"
so feared in The Federalist Papers.66 There has been essentially no re-
form to prevent this possibility. Accordingly, he suggests the develop-
ment of an office of congressional legal counsel charged with the duty
to investigate and prosecute misbehavior of executive, judicial, and leg-
islative officials, whether for their impeachment or for legislation to
cure the evils discovered.67 This new office would oversee the executive
branch and would have the power to make investigations and issue
subpoenas upon its own motion.
I agree with Professor Kurland that little has been done to develop
institutional checks to lessen the likelihood of future Watergates, and
that control of the intelligence establishment by some publicly elected
official is essential. I do not believe, however, that this is the central
problem of presidential abuse of power. For the intelligence establish-
ment is merely a tool-albeit a tool too readily available to one
tempted to abuse it. The central problem is that of controlling the Pres-
63. Id at 211 passim.
64. Id at 177-79.
65. Id at 183-84.
66. Id at 193-95.
67. Id at 195-97.
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ident directly and not merely controlling the multifarious tools avail-
able to a corrupt President to chastize his enemies.
Unfortunately, there are few prospects for immediately effective re-
form to curb presidential power. The most obvious institutional steps
are those designed to increase the information available to the public
and particularly to opinion leaders such as the news media. The Free-
dom of Information Act68 is one small step in this direction. But the
social and historical trends that have elevated the Presidency to its pre-
eminent place are unlikely to be easily reversed. The fact of power in
the Presidency isfair accompli. And I know of no way to control that
power other than by ensuring that the public, or at least the relevant
segments of it, know what the President is doing on all matters of na-
tional importance and why. Presidents will obviously resist this be-
cause it reduces their power. But institutional mechanisms to open up
the discussions of government on a regular basis seem to me the most
promising kind of reform.
In the long run, what is required is a redefinition of the office itself.
We expect the President simultaneously to solve all manner of
problems-from inflation to energy, from foreign policy to public
works. And if he does not, we are likely to punish him at the polls. We
must recognize that the President is only one man, working with often
imperfect knowledge and limited tools to resolve inherently conflicting
problems. When and if the American people recognize that any Presi-
dent is severely limited in his ability to resolve these conflicting priori-
ties and regard the Presidency as something less than the answer to all
of our social problems, presidential power will diminish. Much of the
fear of another Watergate will then also diminish.
It was said of the German people during the Nazi era that they de-
served the government they got. In a larger and less pejorative sense,
the same may be true of the American people today. Professor Kur-
land is absolutely right in concluding that some institutional changes
are necessary to avert some of the excesses of the Nixon years. But
more fundamental change is required to address the central
problems-a change in the attitude of the people toward the nature of
the office of the Presidency.
MARK G. ARNOLD**
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